Purpose. To examine the existential anthropology of G. Marcel and E. Minkowski, in order to demonstrate the necessity of distinguishing the universal-spiritual, as human in human being, apart from the individual-existential in him, and to reveal the hierarchical correlation of biosocial, existential and spiritual spheres in personality. Theoretical basis. Within existential philosophy the author differentiates two separate traditions and proceeds from the insufficiency of the distinction of existential sphere, proposed by phenomenological tradition, showing the necessity of its correlation with the (...) spiritual sphere as a sphere of humanity, proposed by non-phenomenological tradition of G. Marcel and E. Minkowski. Originality. The author presents the anthropological conception of G. Marcel and E. Minkowski, in which human personality is understood as unity of individual-existential and universal-spiritual, which requires a special trans-empirical field of culture, which contains senses, images and symbols of humanity. Also, the author presents the recent developments of existential thinkers in distinguishing existential and spiritual dimensions, both not reducible to the physical and social dimensions. Conclusions. In both existential traditions, the specifically human was founded as a trans-biological and trans-social phenomenon, which appears as indefinable and non-predetermined. But in first tradition, humanity is understood as an existence, as a unique individuality, "project", variant of humanity, equivalent to other variants, and universal is understood as a community of human condition in the world. While in the second tradition, the universal is understood as spiritual. Thus, horizontal level of our private existence, as the process of movement from birth to death, is supplemented by vertical of human, universal ideals and images. Humanity appears as a task, on the way to which human being transcends beyond the limits of his individual "self" to the "super-individual", through inclusion into spiritual community, into universal culture. (shrink)

This introduction to the basic ideas of structural proof theory contains a thorough discussion and comparison of various types of formalization of first-order logic. Examples are given of several areas of application, namely: the metamathematics of pure first-order logic (intuitionistic as well as classical); the theory of logic programming; category theory; modal logic; linear logic; first-order arithmetic and second-order logic. In each case the aim is to illustrate the methods in relatively simple situations and then apply them elsewhere in much (...) more complex settings. There are numerous exercises throughout the text. In general, the only prerequisite is a standard course in first-order logic, making the book ideal for graduate students and beginning researchers in mathematical logic, theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence. For the new edition, many sections have been rewritten to improve clarity, new sections have been added on cut elimination, and solutions to selected exercises have been included. (shrink)

Provability, Computability and Reflection.

It is appropriate that this speech should be full of quotations from Roman drama. These offered the jurymen some compensation for their enforced absence from the theatrical performances of the Ludi Megalenses; on the very day when Cicero demolished Clodia's reputation in court, her brother Clodius, as curule aedile, was nearby presiding at the opening of the Ludi. Brother and sister both had a strong interest in the stage; in Pro Sestio 116 Clodius is described as ‘ipse ille maxime ludius, (...) non solum spectator sed actor et acroama, qui omnia sororis embolia novit’. In Pro Caelio 18 Cicero takes up Crassus' quotation of Ennius' Medea, ‘utinam ne in nemore Pelio …’ ends by calling Clodia ‘the Medea of the Palatine’. Clodius is made to address his sister in a trochaic septenarius, ‘quid clamorem exorsa verbis parvam rem magnam facis?’. A harsh parent is represented by a quotation from Caecilius, a gentle one by Micio from Terence's Adelphoe. Clodia herself is called ‘veteris et plurimarum fabularum poetriae’—this phrase should not be taken to mean that she had actually written plays—and in 65 the whole affair at the baths is likened to a mime with no satisfactory conclusion. (shrink)

I would like to begin with the role of philosophy in solving ecological problems, emphasizing two aspects of its role: the struggle against hostile ideology and the organizing and guiding of activity in the sphere of the development of science and the shaping of its problems. This role of Marxist-Leninist philosophy clearly appears in the complex interdisciplinary problem of the interaction between nature and society.

The article is devoted to the formation of linguistic, communicative and cultural competence among students bilinguals in teaching Russian language and speech culture. The authors put forward the thesis that the training of specialists in the conditions of bilingualism re quires not only a higher level of learning a second language, but also a qualitatively different level of comprehension. It is proved that the discipline ‘Russian and the culture of speech‘ assumes formation of communicative and culturological competence of the higher (...) education institutions, which are trained on two-profile offices taking into account a regional component. Relevance of research in this area is increasing each year since the treatment of the person as the center of all systems of cognition highlights in the pedagogical University the formation of the modern language personality, capable of effective professional activity. The functional approach provides detection of features of functioning of language units in different spheres of public work. The communicative principle means that acquisition of Russian as a means of communication happens in the course of speech practice most approached to process of communication in Russian. The detection of similarity and distinctions between languages, interlingual comparison promotes establishment and a lexical interference. The linguistic-cultural principle provides understanding of language as the phenomena of culture and is connected with ability to define national-cultural components of linguistic units - words, phraseological combinations, grammatical categories of the text. Involvement of regional component as a basis in practice of teaching Russian and culture of speech increases efficiency of all process of training of students of national branch. (shrink)

A. Agreement of Participle Masculine takes precedence over feminine: e.g.In the first two examples the participle may be conceived of as agreeing with the nearer of the two subjects, since it is expressed in the masculine singular. Likewise,refers specifically to. But the third example, in which the participle is in the masculine plural, clearly demonstrates the usual preference for masculine.

Venturing beyond the framework of an existing culture becomes philosophizing when society begins to sense an acute need for a critique of its historical experience and a change in its cultural underpinnings, which are necessary for attaining a qualitatively new level of interpretaion and understanding. Philosophizing appears as a specialized form of life activity in the sphere of the universal, as an ongoing search for new ways and new foundations for developing the diversity of cultural processes lying at the basis (...) of the reproduction of society, culture, and relations. (shrink)

I Begin with quotations from two authoritative works, both of which require modification in the light of the evidence which I have assembled concerning the language of the inscriptions of Attica of the period 323–146 B.C. These quotations are: LSJ s.v. B: ‘in early Attic inscriptions only is used …; without only once in cent, iv B.C., IG 22. 226. 42, after which it becomes gradually prevalent.’ This is very near the truth. Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, § 328: ‘ final (...) with the subjunctive appears first in Aeschylus, and remains in good use in Attic poetry and prose, being almost the only final expression found in the formal language of the Attic inscriptions.’ This, although absolutely correct in relation to the fifth and fourth centuries, is too sweeping for the period 299–146 B.C., and definitely misleading for the period after 146 B.C. (shrink)

One of the clearest phonological developments of the language of Attic inscriptions of the Hellenistic period down to the end of the second century B.C. is the change. I have studied this phenomenon with particular reference to the period 323–146 B.C., taking into account also the trends before 323 and after 146 B.C. down to the end of the pre- Christian era. The object of this article is to draw attention to the fact that in only one instance, the relative (...) pronoun, is there not a marked progressive increase in the frequency of at the expense of. (shrink)

I print the text as given in Pearson. I agree with Jebb and Sheppard that the strophe is sound, and therefore I would retain at 866–7. The problem now lies with the antistrophe, where with the manuscript reading at 877 we lack either or-to give proper responsion with 867. The manuscript text can be vindicated if we detect that simplest of scribal errors, haplography. Thus for 876–7 I would read.

In recent discussions of moral responsibility, two claims have generated considerable attention: 1) a complete account of responsibility cannot ignore the agent’s personal history prior to the time of action; and 2) an agent’s responsibility is not determined solely by whether certain objective facts about the agent obtain (e.g., whether he/she was free of physical coercion) but also by whether, subjectively, the agent views him/herself in a particular way. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza defend these claims and combine them (...) in a novel manner. They argue that responsibility for an action requires that the agent—at some prior time—have taken responsibility for the kind of mechanism, or process, which produced the action (e.g., practical reason). The notion of taking responsibility is then understood subjectively, requiring that the agent believe it appropriate for others to hold him/her responsible for actions produced by that kind of mechanism. I explore how best to understand the role(s) played by the notion of taking responsibility in Fischer and Ravizza’s account and then argue that being responsible for an action does not require that one have taken responsibility in the subjective sense. That is, being responsible is not a matter of believing oneself to be so. This Article does not have an abstract. (shrink)